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1. Introduction 
Experiments on declarative memory (i.e., about facts and episodes that we can 
consciously recollect) usually involve more than one item (e.g., pictures, words, locations, 
voices, etc. or associations between these elements). In other words, the net performance in 
these experiments by construction hides the presence of two opposing forces at work at the 
item-level: ‘forgetting’ (i.e., ‘oblivescence’), which is the inability to express previous 
knowledge, and ‘reminiscence’, which refers to the gained, or regained, ability to express 
knowledge that was previously inaccessible (e.g., Erdelyi, 2010). Until recently, studies 
looking at how sleep influences this type of memory have never really tracked these 
undercurrents. As a result, because the benefit of sleep, over being awake, in most 
experiments comes about as a smaller decline in net performance between the immediate test 
and the retest, the default view has been that sleep stabilizes the learnt information, missing 
out on the possibility that it also promotes reminiscence. 
In Dumay (2016), I examined this possibility by reanalysing two data sets (Dumay & 
Gaskell, 2007; Tamminen, Payne, Stickgold, Wamsley, & Gaskell, 2010) that showed a 
benefit of sleep on both free recall (i.e., Now, tell me what you know) and old/new 
recognition (i.e., Have you heard this before?) of made-up words, distinguishing between 
items remembered at the 0-hr test and not forgotten (i.e., ‘maintained’) by the 12-hr retest, 
and items not remembered at the test, but eventually recovered (i.e., ‘gained’) at the retest 
(i.e., the reminiscence cases). For free recall, this ‘item-fate’ analysis confirmed the anti-
forgetting effect of sleep, with sleep increasing the likelihood of still remembering an item at 
retest. But it also showed a significant contribution of sleep to reminiscence: recovering an 
item that was inaccessible at the immediate test was more likely after sleep than after an 
equivalent period of wake. The recognition data confirmed the effect of sleep on 
reminiscence, but failed to reproduce the benefit for maintained items, yet revealed by free 
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recall. I concluded that sleep protects our memories against forgetting, but at the same time 
also makes them more accessible. Given the presence of significant interactions between 
group (sleep vs. wake) and item-fate in favour of gained items, I also claimed that the benefit 
of sleep to memory was primarily due to increased reminiscence. 
The dissociation between the two effects across tasks (i.e., recognition shows no sleep 
effect on protection against loss, but only an effect on reminiscence) suggests that 
reminiscence may be driven partly by an overnight increase in stimulus familiarity, useful 
only for recognition, whereas protection against loss may not. This separation of the two 
effects was corroborated by the presence of correlations between the probabilities of 
reminiscence and forgetting only for the wake group. In view of these elements, I suggested 
that stronger reminiscence after sleep and protection against loss reflected only partially 
overlapping mechanisms (i.e., they should not be taken exactly as the two facets of the same 
coin). 
Stronger reminiscence after sleep is hard to explain by reduced retroactive 
interference in the hippocampus, especially during slow-wave sleep. Less interference should 
not boost memory accessibility beyond the level achieved at exposure (Mednick, Cai, 
Shuman, Anagnostaras, & Wixted, 2011). This effect seems more readily explained by active 
consolidation mechanisms, such as neural replay (Feld & Born, 2017 for a review): if 
spontaneous reactivation of hippocampal memories strengthens copies in adjacent regions 
and/or associations in the neocortex, it would be surprising not to find increased accessibility 
the next day. But even at the cellular level, ‘synapse homeostasis’ (Tononi & Cirelli, 2014) 
may predict more reminiscence after sleep. After growing in number (or efficacy) throughout 
the day, synaptic spines are pruned (or weakened) overnight, most likely to keep only those 
showing strong and consistent reactivation. If this pruning retains only the fittest 
representations and hence reduces noise, the refinement that this implies would lead us to 
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expect more reminiscence soon after waking-up. In comparison, the mapping between 
protection against loss and underlying mechanisms is less logically constrained, and although 
passive consolidation may first come to mind, this effect could reflect a mixture of both 
active and passive influences. On this basis, and given the behavioural dissociation described 
above, I predicted that changes in active consolidation processes, as produced, for instance, 
by cued reactivation during sleep, may be more visible on, though not necessarily restricted 
to, gained items (i.e., reminiscence), as compared to maintained items (i.e., protection against 
forgetting). 
Recently, Schreiner and Rasch (in press) answered my call by reporting a fate 
analysis of paired-associate translation learning data collected in the cued reactivation 
paradigm. German speakers exposed to Dutch translations of German words during the day 
are re-exposed to some of these pairs, or at least their non-native Dutch words, either within 
the same unbroken wake interval or during the next episode of slow-wave sleep. In this 
paradigm, cuing by the Dutch words during slow-wave sleep (as opposed to wake) improves 
subsequent cued recall. Their first analysis looks at the influence of sleep on forgetting and 
reminiscence, independently of whether or not participants were later re-exposed to the 
information. The authors find that sleep reduces forgetting, which concurs with my own 
recall data, but has no reliable effect on the likelihood of recalling previously inaccessible 
memories (i.e., reminiscence). In addition, they point out that my comparing the magnitude 
of sleep’s contribution to reminiscence vs. protection against loss is conceptually 
questionable. As forgetting can be quantified in terms of either the number of items 
maintained between test and retest, or the number of items lost, relative to the number of 
items recalled at the immediate test, two complementary probabilities are available for one 
and the same construct. Their second analysis moves away from directly comparing sleep to 
wake. It shows that cuing both alleviates forgetting and promotes reminiscence, but only 
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when the cue is experienced in slow-wave sleep. The authors conclude that sleep mainly 
benefits the maintenance of newly acquired memory and that active consolidation at the 
systems level is the driving force behind this effect. 
In this reply, I take Schreiner and Rasch’s (in press) point about the conceptual 
difficulty one runs into when comparing two effects that can each be quantified by two 
complementary probabilities. However, contrary to what the authors would like readers to 
think, the problem can easily be solved. Further, I show that their view of post-sleep 
reminiscence as being just an epiphenomenon of the learning conditions of the experiments 
that I reanalysed is unwarranted. 
 
2. To keep or not to lose? 
To avoid the pitfalls of raw item counts in assessing the presence of a sleep effect on 
forgetting and reminiscence, Dumay (2016) relied on proportions in order to take into 
account the total number of items available to protection against loss vs. reminiscence for 
each participant. Protection against forgetting was operationalized as the number of items 
maintained at the retest, relative to the number of items recalled at the test (i.e., the maximum 
number of items that the participant could have maintained). Reminiscence was the number 
of items gained at the retest, relative to the total number of trained items minus the number of 
items recalled at the test (i.e., the maximum number of items that could have been gained; 
Roediger and Challis, 1989). These proportions are fine for detecting a difference between 
sleep and wake in the likelihood of each phenomenon. However, as Schreiner and Rasch (in 
press) point out, using proportions to compare the magnitude of the sleep effect in each case 
is unsafe, as forgetting can be quantified either ‘optimistically’, as I did it, by focusing on 
maintained items, or ‘pessimistically’, by focusing on lost items. In other words, two 
probabilities are available to represent the same concept, with the result that the value of the 
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interaction between group (sleep vs. wake) and item trajectory (protection against loss vs. 
reminiscence) changes depending on which of the two probabilities is used, a fact that I had 
overlooked. 
Schreiner and Rasch’s (in press) solution to this conundrum, however, is not 
satisfying, as they go on to compare gained items simultaneously to maintained vs. lost items, 
and that, certainly, does not remove the ambiguity. Further, they miss out on the fact that 
their logic applies also to reminiscence, which, like forgetting, can be coded in one of two 
ways, namely, focusing on either gained items or ungained items. Thus, their multiple-
comparison based approach is itself slippery, as the picture will change again from the 
moment reminiscence is operationalized in pessimistic terms, looking at ungained items 
instead. Besides, the authors provide no explanation as to how one should adjudicate between 
one and the other interaction terms obtained using this approach. For my free recall data, for 
instance, even though the wake-to-sleep ratio for lost items correctly estimated by the authors 
at 1.72 (wake: 54.4% vs. sleep: 31.7%) is still numerically smaller than the sleep-to-wake 
ratio for gained items, the interaction between group (i.e., sleep vs. wake) and item fate is not 
significant when, instead of maintained items as in Dumay (2016), lost items are used as 
comparison point (free recall: F(1,68) = 1.67, p > .20, 2p = .024). A similar ambiguity arises 
for old/new recognition, with a ratio for lost items of 1.27 (wake: 21.7% vs. sleep: 17.0%) 
and an interaction not significant anymore if maintained items are swapped for lost ones 
(F(1,58) = 1.15, p > .28, 2p = .019). Without a principled approach telling us how to deal 
with these conflicting outcomes, at this point I would not even risk comparing the two effects 
using such floating probabilities. 
Maintaining the ambiguity, obviously, allows Schreiner and Rasch (in press) to 
motivate the use of the cuing paradigm as providing a better approach. I fail to see, however, 
how testing whether systems consolidation possibly underpins protection against forgetting 
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and/or reminiscence provides a means of gauging the spontaneous contribution of sleep to 
each phenomenon: the two approaches are complementary, not in competition. 
To deal with the problem of shadow probabilities, what we need is a variable that 
expresses the two facets of each effect (i.e., protection against loss/forgetting; 
reminiscence/nonreminiscence) in strictly symmetrical, though opposite, terms. That way, 
whether one quantifies protection against loss ‘optimistically’, in terms of maintained items, 
or ‘pessimistically’, in terms of lost items, makes no difference; and likewise for 
reminiscence, quantified in terms of gained, or ungained, items. The difference to the point of 
equilibrium between these two opposite tendencies, relative to the maximum number of items 
available in the background gives us exactly that. Hence, I reanalysed my own datasets and 
Schreiner and Rasch’s taking: 
- for protection against loss, the number of maintained items minus half the number 
of items recalled at test (i.e., 50% of what could possibly be maintained), relative to the 
number of items that were recalled at test; 
- for reminiscence, the number of gained items minus half the number of items that 
were not recalled at test (i.e., 50% of what could possibly be gained), relative to the number 
of items that were not recalled at test. This does not change the statistical reliability of the 
effect of group (sleep vs. wake) at each level of item fate, but it allows us to assess the 
interaction independently from the base likelihood of forgetting and reminiscence that 
polluted the normalized proportions used in Dumay (2016) and Schreiner and Rasch (in 
press). 
The results presented in Fig. 1-a force me to revise my conclusions regarding the 
relative strength of protection against loss and reminiscence in how sleep benefits memory 
recall. Contrary to the picture produced by the sleep-to-wake ratios in Dumay (2016), the 
impact of sleep on free recall is primarily carried by protection against loss (.18 vs. -.04), 
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with a boost twice as large compared to reminiscence (-.33 vs. -43). This result was backed-
up by a significant two-way interaction (F(1,70) = 4.63, p < .04, 2p = .062). Note, in 
passing, that this result is at odds also with the conclusions that Schreiner and Rasch would 
have reached by sticking to normalized proportions and coding forgetting in terms of lost 
items. As we saw above (second paragraph of Section 2), this approach, if anything, would 
still favour reminiscence over protection against loss, at least descriptively. 
In comparison, the patterns observed for recognition and paired-translation learning 
are largely unchanged against what was conveyed in the individual papers. For old/new 
recognition (Fig. 1-b), the strong effect of sleep on reminiscence (.08 vs. -.14) was 
significantly larger than the nonsignificant tiny group difference in protection against loss 
(.33 vs. .28; F(1,57) = 4.67, p < .04, 2p = .076).1 The dissociation between recognition and 
recall in terms of sleep effects on item fate was bolstered by a significant three-way 
interaction with task (F(1,127) = 9.46, p < .004, 2p = .069). [Again, Schreiner and Rasch’s 
(in press) approach biased towards lost items would miss out on both of these interactions (Fs 
≤ 1).] For paired-translation learning (Fig. 1-c), the results confirmed the stronger effect of 
sleep on protection against loss (.34 vs. .26) against the null effect that they reported for 
reminiscence (-.40 vs. -.41; F(1,137) = 18.51, p < .0001, 2p = .119). In sum, based on these 
nonfloating probabilities, the influence of sleep on the fate of recall is more similar across the 
two studies than it appeared initially. The question remains, however, as to why Schreiner 
and Rasch’s (in press) paired translation learning data do not show any of the post-sleep 
reminiscence implicated in my recall and recognition data. I treat this question in the 
following section. 
 
                                                        
1 The dfs are 57 (instead of an expected 58) due to one participant with a maximum number 
of items that could be gained of 0 (i.e., they had 100% correct at the 0-hr test). 
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3. Post-sleep reminiscence: An epiphenomenon? 
Because they fail to find a reliable effect of sleep on reminiscence, and presumably 
also because paired-associate learning task is the bread and butter of sleep and memory 
researchers, Schreiner and Rasch (in press) assume that the positive effects that I reported are 
specific to the lexical consolidation paradigm (Gaskell & Dumay, 2003), in particular its high 
number of exposures during training. Their dismissing the generality of the effect is obvious 
from statements like this one (on p. 2) in reference to their pattern of net performance 
showing the typical reduced memory loss after sleep and in which they imply that increased 
reminiscence is found only in cases of hypermnesia: “In contrast to the general results in 
Dumay (2016) where sleep led to improved performance, this pattern of result already 
suggests that the beneficial effects of sleep on memory in our paradigm expressed mainly in a 
relatively diminished forgetting in the sleep group (5.49 ± .86%) as compared to the wake 
group (15.5 ± 1.19%)”. Evidently, if the pattern of averages already tells Schreiner and Rasch 
what is going on at the item-memory level, then why then carry out an item fate analysis? As 
my old/new recognition data illustrate, surprising differences can be found between what the 
net, average-based performance suggests (i.e., less forgetting after sleep than after wake) and 
what the items are actually doing in the background (i.e., showing only increased 
reminiscence after sleep; see Fig. 1-b below). 
Their dismissing of sleep-induced reminiscence is also evident from their penultimate 
paragraph (on p. 5), where they go to great lengths to list the many alternative factors known 
to affect reminiscence, such as increased attentional resources, changes in memory search 
strategies, retrieval practice, and even chance, etc. These factors, of course, affect the 
likelihood of reminiscence (as they do also affect forgetting to some extent, for that matter). 
However, they are all largely orthogonal to the question, and cannot easily explain, without 
In Press at Cortex 
10 
 
the notion of memory consolidation, why reminiscence is more likely after sleep than after 
wake. 
Actually, there is something puzzling about Schreiner and Rasch’s results: they show 
that cuing during slow-wave sleep boosts gained responses the next morning, which suggests 
that spontaneous reactivation as part of systems consolidation is an open route to 
reminiscence. And yet, they show no reminiscence effect when simply comparing sleep to 
wake. This null effect is at odds with the free recall and recognition data reported in Dumay 
(2016), but also with the emerging literature on relational memory, which concerns the 
knowledge of the underlying structure of an episode and the associations between its various 
constituting elements encoded individually. Payne et al. (2009) showed that after overnight 
sleep, or even a post-lunch nap (as opposed to an equivalent amount of time awake), 
participants are more likely to recall erroneously an ‘unseen’ target word (e.g., ‘window’) 
when in fact they were presented only with a mini-list of semantic neighbours (e.g., ‘door, 
glass, pane, curtain, ledge, etc.’; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). This suggests 
that, by virtue of their spontaneous reactivation during sleep, the mini-lists strengthen their 
internal structures to the point of filling the gaps by restoring missing semantic associates. In 
a similar vein, Dumay, Sharma, Kellen and Abdelrahim (in press) found response repetition 
priming (i.e., the fact that you save time when the current trial requires the same response as 
the previous trial; Bertelson, 1965) to be stronger when the stimuli (i.e., made-up words) 
presented on trials n-1 and n for a classification of their printcolor had been both studied 
(uncolored) as part of the same item set seven days before the test, as opposed to just before 
it. As with semantic restorations in the Payne et al. (2009) study, this boost in response 
repetition priming as a result of consolidation most likely reflects implicit episodic 
associations developing after encoding between the items of the set (see Alger & Payne, 
2016; Ellenbogen, Hu, Payne, Titone, & Walker, 2007; Lau, Tucker, & Fishbein, 2010, for 
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related work). Just on these grounds, as performance in a declarative task is inevitably 
determined, to some extent, by the ability of the items to evoke one another on the fly, the 
stronger bonds between the items after consolidation should result in less forgetting and more 
reminiscence. 
To find what they find and reach the conclusion that sleep promotes reminiscence 
only in specific circumstances, Schreiner and Rasch (in press) take advantage of the 139 
participants whom they tested in the various versions of their translation-associate cuing 
paradigm. One hundred and thirty-nine is an impressive number. The trouble is that the 
authors appear to have lost sight of the fact that for 43 participants (i.e., 60.6%) out of the 71 
included in the sleep group, 36 (i.e., 30%) out of the 120 German-Dutch word pairs, which 
they were tested on, were not the same as for the rest of the sample, including the whole 
wake group.2 In other words, the item fate analysis of the effect of sleep on memory that 
Schreiner and Rasch report is compromised by the phonetic, semantic and perhaps even 
emotional idiosyncrasies of these 36 pairs, as well as by resulting differences in the 
structural/relational properties of each item set. To illustrate with just two dimensions that are 
easily quantifiable (and I am not saying that these variables are implicated necessarily), 
whereas the Dutch words in these 36 pairs were on average 3.64 (sd: .83) phonemes long in 
the set given to these 43 participants, they were almost twice as long [6.11 (sd: 1.80)] in the 
corresponding pairs of the other set (t(1,70) = 7.47, p < .0001). Likewise, whereas 31 out of 
these 36 pairs were cognates (i.e., translations that are phonetically similar on all of their 
morphemes across the two languages; e.g., Flasche-fles [bottle/flask]) in the set given to 
these 43 participants, only 17 out of the 36 were cognates in the other set. Overall, these 
differences, at the level of the individual words, the pairs (such as their cognate status), and 
the whole set itself (see above), between the sleep and wake groups, are likely to have 
                                                        
2 These 43 participants are those of the Schreiner, Lehmann, and Rasch (2015) study. 
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affected not just learning and retrieval, and the base likelihood of forgetting and 
reminiscence, but also what the sleeping brain does with the learnt pairs during the interval. 
Spotting the error only requires comparing the stimuli listed in their Supplemental Materials. 
At a minimum, the authors should have counterbalanced the occurrence of the two item sets 
over a similar proportion of participants in the sleep and wake groups, as I did when I 
bundled the free recall data of Dumay and Gaskell (2007) and Tamminen et al. (2010). 
Without that, Schreiner and Rasch are comparing apples and oranges! 
I reanalysed the Schreiner and Rasch (in press) data, excluding those 43 participants 
who had been given a different item set from the rest of the sample. This left me with 28 
participants in the sleep group and a wake group of 68 untouched. Note that restricting the 
analyses to the items common to both sets, in order to keep all participants instead, is not a 
solution, as the context of learning, of consolidation, and of retrieval would still differ 
between the sleep and wake groups (see the second paragraph above). 
The net performance on this restricted sample showed the typical protective effect of 
sleep as with the full sample, with less forgetting after sleep (-1.6%) than after wake (-7.6%), 
relative to the 0-hr test (52.3% for the sleep group vs. 50.8% for the wake group), and the 
interaction between group and session on arcsined proportions was significant (F(1,94) = 
37.04, p < .001, 2p = .283). In contrast to Schreiner and Rasch’s (in press) results, however, 
item fate showed a significant effect of sleep not just on protection against loss (.36 vs. .26; 
t(89.14, with unequal σ²) = -6.97, p < .0001), but also on reminiscence (-.38 vs. -.41; t(94) = -
2.60, p < .02; see Fig. 1-d). For comparison, these effects would correspond to a ratio of 
normalized proportions of 1.75 (instead of 1.47) for lost items and one of 1.31 (instead of 
1.17) for gained items (cf. their Section 3.1). Still, the presence of a significant two-way 
interaction on these proportion differences confirmed the stronger impact of sleep on 
protection against loss (F(1,94) = 14.40, p < .001, 2p = .133). In short, when one looks more 
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carefully at Schreiner and Rasch’s data, one does find reliable evidence that sleep promotes 
reminiscence. 
Their cuing results, in contrast, should be relatively less affected by the presence of 
two item sets in the sleep group. Cuing was manipulated within participants. Further, the 
analysis reported by Schreiner and Rasch (in press) excludes all participants cued by full 
pairs, instead of just by the non-native Dutch words, and these participants are amongst the 
43 trained on the alternate item set never shown to the wake group. In view of the 
dissociation of the two effects across tasks and the presence of covariation only during wake, 
I predicted that if the effect of sleep on reminiscence reflects the involvement of an active 
consolidation process (i.e., more than does the effect of sleep against forgetting), then the 
“effect [of cuing during sleep] should be most visible on gained (as opposed to maintained) 
items ” (Dumay, 2016, p. 295). Schreiner and Rasch find that cuing during slow-wave sleep 
indeed boosts reminiscence more than it does protection against loss. Even though the 
authors insist that cuing affects lost and gained items equally (p. 2, paragraph 1), the presence 
of this interaction confirms my hunch.3 
 
4. Conclusion 
By pointing out the ambiguity linked to the presence of shadow probabilities in 
Dumay (2016), Schreiner and Rasch (in press) led me to reanalyse both data sets using a 
more appropriate measure of protection against loss and reminiscence. The outcome shows a 
pattern of item fate, for recall tasks at least, much more similar across the two studies, with 
sleep mostly preventing forgetting. I am therefore revising my earlier conclusions that sleep 
benefits memory primarily by increasing reminiscence. My story, however, does not change 
                                                        
3 Contrary to what Schreiner and Rasch’ (in press) state (on p. 2, paragraph 1), I never said 
that “cuing during sleep should primarily impact behavioural gains without significant effects 
on memory losses”. This is misrepresenting my view. 
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for recognition memory, which dissociates by showing an effect of sleep only on 
reminiscence in a three-way interaction. Together with cuing affecting reminiscence more 
than forgetting, I still conclude that this dissociation tells us that different sets of processes 
are behind the effect of sleep in each case, with (by the Schreiner and Rasch probing-by-
cuing logic) possibly a stronger causal relation existing between systems consolidation and 
reminiscence. In any event, post-sleep reminiscence, is not as specific as Schreiner and Rasch 
want it to be, and certainly it is not linked to hypermnestic cases: when analysed more 
carefully even their data show post-sleep reminiscence. Thus, from this angle, “to gain or not 
to gain [...]”, as Schreiner and Rasch ask in their title is hardly the question at this point, and 
my original claim summarized in my title “Sleep not just prevents forgetting, but also makes 
memories more accessible” is supported, rather than challenged, by their data. 
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Figure caption 
Fig. 1. Mean difference to equilibrium by maximum number of items available for 
protection against loss (i.e., maintained items) and reminiscence (i.e., gained items), in the 
sleep and wake groups, for: (a) Dumay’s (2016) free recall data; (b) Dumay’s (2016) old/new 
recognition data; (c) Schreiner and Rasch’s (in press) paired-associate learning (full sample); 
and (d) their sleep and wake groups trained on the same item set (restricted sample). Positive 
values indicate more protection against loss (or more reminiscence) than forgetting (or 
absence of reminiscence) on average. Error bars show standard errors. Also displayed are the 
p-values for simple effects and interactions of interest. 
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